 | Daniel Dennett: Master of Being Owned
Current mood:  pessimistic Don't get too engrossed in my blogs. I don't want to get hooked into doing them. I figure I may as well let off some steam. So here it is. Enjoy.
If there's one thing that Daniel Dennett should be remembered for, in his E grade celebrity status of a life, is his magnetic ability to cop ownage from philosophers world wide. And not just philosophers, but children too are laughing at his idiocricy.
What? I hear you ask, grabbing your phones, waiting for the right moment to dial my number and ask me what the fuck I am going on about. Just chillax. Put down that phone, and Dennett, put down that gun that is resting in your mouth, the cold steel rattling against your yellow teeth. You don't get much love Dennett, but I respect you. You stood up for what you believed in and even though you got owned so harshly, and that you basically rattled off contradictions left right and centre, I would personally like to apologise on behalf of philosophers around the world and offer my pity, and my mercy upon thee.
Just don't write another philosophical thing again.
I thought I may as well not leave people hanging with this web log and try and help people understand who the fuck Daniel Dennett is. I will do this by posting excerpts form my essay "Dennett Owned: An Insight into Philosophical Incompetencies" and this will identify who Dennett is and why he desrves such harsh ownage. (Funny how this turned into a serious philosophical discussion despite originally being a comedic statement).
Dennett (1991) argues that qualia cannot exist and that it is an epiphenomenon meaning that all mental phenomena are derived from the physical. Dennett also argues the existence of the types of 'zombies' that were mentioned in the above paragraphs. He states that if they act like just like conscious beings then they are in fact conscious beings. In response, Dennett seems to accept a weak form of qualia, referring to the natural properties of experiences that are indescribable, inexpressible and non physical. Another criticism of Dennett's approach comes from Chalmers who states that Dennett's argument misses the point by redefining consciousness as an external property and therefore ignoring the subjective aspect. Dennett states further that the subjective aspect is ignored because it simply does not exist however Dennett, in my opinion, has not given people a valid enough reason to accept this assumption simply because he has accepted a weaker definition of qualia. Because he accepts this weaker version of qualia he is misinterpreting the non-physical phenomenon's associated with consciousness. Therefore he is arguing the distinction between the easy problem of consciousness and the hard problem of consciousness from an incorrect interpretation.
Dennett (1991) refers to a term called Heterophenomenology in which he describes a third person scientific approach to the study of consciousness. The study consists of self-report studies to discover how a subject views the world and themselves. The study applies the scientific method with an anthropologic slant. The study begs for the subject to be taken seriously and accept everything they say, but the study also allows the researcher to view the world around them and conclude that the subject is wrong about even their own mind. This is done by comparing self beliefs to subpersonal processes. Subpersonal processes are states that are attributed to a subsystem, rather than the person as a whole. If these do not match up, then the validity of the responses from the subjects can be questioned. Zahavi (2007) states that the study does not consider first person perspectives, only the third person perspective. So if Heterophenomenologists are prevented on relying on their own first-personal relationship with consciousness, it is difficult to justify how they could describe and identify the mental states of subjects. For Heterophenomenology studies to work, contrary to Dennett's belief, a science of consciousness should draw from the first, second and third points of view, just like how we engage in the everyday practice of understanding not only ourselves but others as well.
Zahavi (2007) interprets Heterophenomenology as the study of reports of conscious phenomena rather than the study of conscious phenomena. This is because Dennett stays neutral on whether conscious phenomena actually exist. Dennett argues that neutrality is important and required as in any anthropological study. He states that we should not prejudge the phenomenological investigation by stating that conscious phenomena are real. However Zahavi notes that this principal of neutrality is Dennett's own view and that it conflicts and questions the compatibility with another principal, the principle of metaphysical minimalism, which seems to be a characterisation of Heterophenomenology. The principal of metaphysical minimalism is quite similar to the materialist view of eliminative materialism, or eliminativism, which argues that people's common sense understanding of the mind, known as folk psychology, is false. Additionally the theory argues that behaviour and experience can only be explained adequately on a biological level. The incompatibility between this principal and the principal of neutrality is that Dennett's study cannot be considered neutral because it contains the characteristics of eliminativism, or the principal of metaphysical minimalism, and therefore dismisses the idea of Heterophenomenology. This also strengthens the idea that the hard problem and the easy problem of consciousness both exist and that the hard problem cannot be explained by induction of the easy problem.
Dennett (1991) further states that when consciousness is understood, and that there is no more mystery, then there will be more beauty and plenty of room for awe. His argument seems to be ignoring the issue of experience, let alone consciousness, completely. Strawson (1994) identifies this and states that this is unconvincing because if you deny the existence of experience then no account of reality or consciousness is correct. In fact, you would be denying the existence of the reality of the experience of pain. Strawson then states that to suggest that there seems to be an experience but in fact there isn't is contradictory as seeming itself is an experience. (Which means total ownage...and proof that Dennett should never write again).
For a complete reference list. see comments! I will do more updates to this if Dennett were to ever comment back. But I'd be surprised if he didn't commit suicide after that brutal ownage. |
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